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From its inception at the origins of American philosophy up until 
contemporary reappraisals of traditional pragmatist themes and approaches, 
the pragmatist tradition has defied every attempt at defining its specific 
identity. The diversity and richness of pragmatism as a philosophical tradition 
can be appreciated by looking at the great variety of conflicting positions and 
perspectives on central issues of democratic theory and practice which have 
been argued to fall within its scope. It is possible to find pragmatist views 
scattered along the spectrum of debates such as those between the epistemic 
or ethical nature of democratic decision-making, ‘thin’-procedural vs. ‘thick’-
substantial views of the normative scope of democracy, and liberal vs. 
communitarian conceptions of democratic life and society. Moreover, while 
some pragmatists have primarily engaged in the theoretical and foundational 
project of defining and justifying democratic principles and institutions, 
others see pragmatism primary contribution to politics as the critical and 
educational effort of shaping and transforming actual democratic practice and 
culture.  
This volume hosts a wide range of pragmatist reflections focusing on 
different aspects of the theory and practice of democracy, with a view both to 
exploring the richness and variety of this philosophical tradition and raising 
the question of its specificity and identity. In this brief introduction we 
highlight some of the main themes emerging from the different contributions 
to the volume. 
In the opening paper Robert Talisse develops further his project of 
providing a justification of democracy from a Peircean epistemological 
perspective. He argues that a viable pragmatist democratic theory should 
abandon Deweyan comprehensive approaches to democracy, which are unable 
to account for John Rawls’ insight that contemporary liberal democratic 
societies are characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism. Considering 
that according to pragmatists there is an internal connection between proper 
philosophy and democratic politics, in the sense that for pragmatism 
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meaningful critical thinking can only be conducted democratically, Talisse 
points out that democratic theory should not only be seen as a central concern 
for a pragmatist political theory, but as a crucial test for attesting the very 
viability of pragmatist philosophy. It is in order to address this viability 
challenge that Talisse recommends to drop the anti-pluralistic Deweyan-way-
of-life approach to democracy and endorse an alternative view inspired to 
Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatist social epistemology.  
Roberto Frega in his contribution outlines the main tenets of a pragmatist 
theory of public reason drawing on certain overlooked aspects of John 
Dewey’s political thinking. Sharing with Talisse the distrust towards 
traditional comprehensive Deweyan approaches to democratic politics, Frega 
re-examines Dewey’s epistemology of practice by means of a radical 
reconstruction of political epistemology centred on the notions of deliberation 
and justification. Through a critical account of some of main conceptions of 
public reason in contemporary political philosophy, such as those put forth by 
Rawls and Jurgen Habermas, Frega provides a distinct account of democratic 
practice which mediates between idealistic-liberal and critical-theoretical 
positions. Both Frega’s and Talisse’s papers show the increasing importance of 
epistemological arguments in democratic theory. While relying on different 
epistemological outlooks and pointing to different conceptions of the nature 
and role of justification in democratic theory, both papers claim that one of 
pragmatism key contribution to contemporary political debate lays in its 
account of the place of rationality in human affairs.  
Gideon Calder and Fabrizio Trifiro’ focuses precisely on the importance of 
philosophical theorization for political practice and especially the practice of 
democracy. Calder, through a critical exploration of Richard Rorty and 
Nancy Fraser’s anti-metaphysical treatments of democracy, argues that to 
address key practical challenges facing democratic societies we require 
venturing to a theoretical vantage point further from ground-level political 
practice than either Rorty or Fraser would prefer. In particular, reflecting on 
the circularity inherent to the projects of democracy and social inclusion, 
namely that the elaboration of principles of democracy and inclusion 
presupposes democratic and inclusive processes of decision-making, Calder 
concludes that the only escape from this circular movement is through a 
recourse to ‘prior philosophy.’ Looking at the challenges of creating equal 
opportunities for disabled people he suggests that the meta-principles that 
would allow us to escape this dead-end for democratic politics can be found in 
the capability approach elaborated by Amartya Sen.  
Trifiro’ endorses instead a ground-level ethical/political approach to the 
everyday challenges facing liberal democracies, including what he identifies as 
the structural tensions within the liberal democratic project between the 
values of liberty and equality, liberal and democratic rights, and universalistic 
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and particularistic aspirations. Trifiro’s approach draws on the anti-
metaphysical and anti-sceptical works of Rorty and Putnam at a meta-
normative level, and the deliberative turn in democratic theory and the 
capability approach to autonomy, at the normative level. He maintains that 
there is no philosophical argument that can protect liberal democracies from 
the challenges and threats they face, but only concrete and serious political 
and moral commitment. Looking at the challenges posed by the increasing 
intercultural contacts associated with contemporary globalization he argues 
that an anti-foundationalist approach to normativity that gives priority to 
the ethical and the political over the ontological and the epistemological is not 
only epistemically viable but also highly desirable for the fullest realization of 
the liberal democratic project in a deliberative spirit.  
Mark Porrovecchio questions the assumption behind Talisse’s viability 
argument, that there is a necessary internal relationship between pragmatist 
philosophy and democratic politics, by focusing on the neglected works of the 
British philosopher Friedrich. C. Schiller. Pointing out how Schiller’s 
Jamesian humanism should be regarded as falling squarely within the 
pragmatist tradition and how he was able to accommodate his pragmatist 
humanism with the endorsement of eugenics and authoritarianism, 
Porrovecchio argues that the association of pragmatism with democracy and 
equalitarianism is forced and unjustified. Porrovecchio thus shows the extent 
to which the reintegration of Schiller’s voice in the pragmatist tradition would 
not only contribute to enrich the pragmatist movement but also provide a 
more accurate account of the significance of pragmatist epistemology for 
political theory, and liberal democratic politics in particular.  
Joëlle Zask outlines the main tenets of a pragmatist liberal democratic 
culture by bringing together Dewey’s notion of the public and the different 
approaches to self-government elaborated by Thomas Jefferson, Henry D. 
Thoreau, and Alexis de Tocqueville. The resulting pragmatist view of liberal 
democracy is centred on the appreciation of the ineradicable ‘situatedness’ of 
every social agent, which is taken to entail that genuine democratic self-
government must rely on the agents’ not replaceable knowledge of their own 
specific situation. Such an approach, which counters the epistocratic tradition 
that grounds the right to govern upon the possession of some specific 
competence or knowledge not available to ordinary agents, purports to 
overcome the liberal/communitarian opposition by merging collective and 
individual autonomy in the radical project of comprehensive practices of self-
government spanning across all forms of collective agency.   
Barbara Thayer-Bacon, drawing on Dewey theory of social transaction and 
his anti-foundationalist epistemology, endorses a similar comprehensive view 
of democracy as a mode of associated living encompassing all fronts of life, 
with the intent to move beyond individualism and collectivism and liberal 
ROBERTO FREGA & FABRIZIO TRIFIRÒ 
 10
democracy as we know it. The cornerstone of this radical political view is a 
transactional view of the selves as embedded in social relations which they 
continuously help shaping while being at the same time shaped by them. She 
takes this indissoluble social interconnection to point in a Deweyan way to the 
crucial role to be played by public education in equipping us for life in 
pluralist democratic communities and making us able to recognise the risks of 
oppression and exploitation lurking behind accepted social practice. 
In a similar vein Sandra Laugier argues that Stanley Cavell’s reading of 
Ralph W. Emerson’s views about democracy shows us the way to overcome 
the individualism/collectivism dualism which has informed the debate 
between liberals and communitarians. This reading is centred on the 
appreciation of the Emersonian concept of self-reliance as the defining trait of 
a progressive democratic culture. The driving idea is that it is only by valuing, 
safeguarding and fostering the critical voice of self-reliant individuals that it is 
possible to prevent the degeneration of democratic consent into social 
conformism. Yet, Laugiers maintains that this radical form of individualism is 
not to be regarded as the apology of the selfish pursuit of private interests. It 
is compatible with the pursuit of the public interest, since Emerson’s self-
reliant individuals are immersed in the ordinary everyday life they share with 
their fellow human beings, thus pursuing common interests. On this view, the 
value of education for democracy is seen as being that of helping creating self-
reliant citizens, rather than exclusively knowledgeable individuals.    
Filipe Carreira da Silva joins voice with Thayer-Bacon and Laugier in 
stressing the crucial role played by schooling and public education in the 
formation of individual selves and communities. His contribution illustrates 
the significance for democratic politics of George H. Mead’s social 
psychological and evolutionist philosophy of education. In particular, through 
an examination of Mead’s views on a variety of issues including the educative 
role of the family, the pedagogical role model of the experimental scientific 
method and the public role of schools in providing people with the skills and 
capacities required to participate actively in modern industrial economies and 
democratic societies, da Silva shows how it is possible to see emerging form 
Mead’s social psychology of education a pragmatist, egalitarian and 
deliberative ethos of democracy. This is an ethos whose realization, from the 
local to the national and the global levels, depends crucially on informed 
citizenry and active public spheres.  
Kenneth Stikkers turns from the public role of education in equipping 
citizens for democratic life to that of intellectuals in identifying actual and 
potential threats and challenges to democratic societies, elaborating creative 
resolutions to address them, and raising public awareness and self-reflection 
about what it means to live in a democratic society. Following Dewey’s 
insight that philosophy should operate as a ‘liaison officer’ for different areas 
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of culture, Sikkers maintains that pragmatism should urge public intellectuals 
to divert their attention from the theoretical task of justifying democracy 
against antidemocratic people to the transformative task of dealing with 
existing concrete threats to democratic life. In the background of his 
argument for the critical and transformative role of public intellectuals lays a 
pragmatist understanding of epistemic fallibilism which rejects adversary 
politics for the constructive inclusion and confrontation of all the dissenting 
voices. Enlargement of experience and not confutation is offered as the 
regulative ethos of social and political inquiry.  
This seems to be the same ethos which Brian Duff, in his paper, argues to 
be threatened by approaches to social conflict based on the communitarian 
idea of parenthood as opposed to the universalistic idea of brotherhood. Duff 
develops his argument through a critical examination of certain aspects of 
Rorty’s and Cornel West’s thought, which he takes as exemplifying a 
communitarian pragmatist answer to the normative contingency and 
pluralism that follows from the rejection of foundationalist philosophy. Duff’s 
main contention is that such approaches eventually lead to the stagnation of 
political debate and the conservative defence of the status quo.   
Shane Ralston takes issue with the idea that democratic deliberation is 
primarily if not exclusively a group activity. He looks at Dewey’s theory of 
moral deliberation and Robert Goodin’s theory of ‘deliberation within’ as 
instances of more comprehensive and satisfying accounts of deliberative 
democracy that integrate dialogical and monological perspectives. The lesson 
deliberative democrats should take from the proto-deliberative democrat 
Dewey, according to Ralston, is the appreciation of the key role of 
imaginative thinking in formulating appropriate responses to the problematic 
situations we face in our everyday lives. He argues that Goodin’s account of 
deliberation, transposing Dewey’s insight from the moral to the political 
sphere, is the one deliberative democrats should look at.  
In the final contribution Brian Butler draws a pragmatist philosophy law 
from Dewey’s views of democracy and rational inquiry. Through a critical 
comparison with the approaches to law elaborated by Ronald Dworkin and 
Richard Posner, Butler argues that Dewey’s pragmatist view of law is to be 
preferred. While Dworkin’s approach is too principled and thus less 
accommodating to dissent and diversity, Posner’s minimalist approach leaves 
spaces for social cooperation too exposed and vulnerable to the strategic 
pursuit of sell-interest. Dewey’s ethical and fallibilist approach is more 
conducive to the creation of legal systems fit for participatory, pluralist and 
deliberative democratic societies. 
 
 
